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Weather Risk and the Viability 




This paper presents preliminary results on the possible demand for weather insurance in China. 
Results from 1,564 farm households from Western and Central China between October 2007 and 
October 2008 suggest that the greater risk for farmers is drought followed by excessive rain. 
Heat is less critical as a risk but more significant than cool weather. Results suggest a strong 
interest in precipitation insurance with 50% and 44% of respondents indicating strong interest in 
the product. Supplementary results indicate that interest is equal between planting, cultivating, 
and harvesting. Furthermore results suggest that farmers are willing to adopt new ideas, and 
where possible already take action to self insure through diversification and other means, The 
results are encouraging. Examples and discussion of how weather insurance can be implemented 
is included in the text. 
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Introduction 
Political reforms in China’s rural regions are opening up new avenues for progress and risk 
management for millions of farms and farm households. The Chinese government has within the 
past year authorized an investigation into agricultural insurance. The burst of research and 
applications of weather insurance in both developed countries and developing countries     
combined with interest from the World Bank (The International Research Group for Climate and 
Society (IRI) 2009) suggest that a wide array of applications could be feasible in China. In fact 
with respect to China, weather-linked insurance may be efficient. China’s rural areas include 
millions of farms, the majority of which are between 5 and 10 mu (1 mu = 1/6 acre) in size and 
very poor (about 4,000 RMB per capita or $600 U.S / year). The sheer number of farms suggests 
that conventional crop insurance would not be feasible because of the underwriting costs, and 
broader based area yield insurance might not be feasible because yield history is scarce. 
Providing insurance against specific weather events such as drought or extreme heat may be a 
cost effective means to providing risk management strategies. 
The relationship between specific weather events and agricultural productivity has not 
been studied extensively in China. However, this study can not be more prescient as parts of 
China faced the most severe drought in late 2008 and early 2009 in more than 50 years.  As of 
February 2009 the drought, nearing 100 days, affected at least 3,385 million acres across 12 
provinces, including the wheat-producing areas in Henan, Anhui and Shandong provinces. 
Deficits in some areas are 80% below average rainfall. So desperate was the need for rain that 
Chinese soldiers loaded rockets with cloud-seeding chemicals and fired them into the sky over 
drought-stricken areas in the effort to produce rain, and had plans in place to divert water from 
its two longest rivers to drought-stricken areas. However, the remoteness of some areas and the   4
lack of irrigation technology suggests that not all farmers will benefit from these actions (CNN 
2009). Beijing has set aside 100m Yuan ($ 14m) of funding to help farmers combat the problem  
In Anhui Province estimates put losses at 1.6bn Yuan requiring the Provincial government to 
provide millions of Yuan in aid to farmers(Guardian 2009). 
In 2008 a drought in China's northeast Liaoning province left nearly 700,000 people 
without drinking water after rainfall between January and March fell to 20% of its normal value, 
threatening maize and rice farming. From January to the end of March 2008, Liaoning had 
received less than 2 centimeters (less than an inch) of rain with 66 reservoirs drying up, and a 
rush to build 1,700 new wells so that spring planting could proceed (Reuters 2008). In 2006 the 
worst drought in 51 years was reported for Chongqing, Sichuan and Liaoning. In Chongqing 
there was no rain for more than 70 days, and two-thirds of the rivers had dried up and there were 
reports of residents in some mountain villages having to walk up to 2km (1.25 miles) to get 
water. Estimates put losses from the 2006 drought at 11.74bn Yuan ($1.24bn) (BBC 2006).  
The recent droughts in 2006, 2008 and 2009 are not, however a new phenomenon. Buck 
(1936) asked farmer respondents throughout China to report the number of droughts and other 
natural calamities that could be recalled between the years of 1904 and 1929. Across China there 
were 5.5 droughts resulting in a crop loss of more than 20% with the highest being in the wheat 
growing regions. The average crop loss during these periods of drought was 46%.  In the same 
time frame farmers reported an average of 1.8 droughts that led to wide-spread famine.  While 
China’s social safety-net and a developing infrastructure will avoid problems of famine in the 
modern day, then as now drought can cause a reduced standard of living, a spread in income 
inequality, local price hikes, and mass migration. The current regime of land user rights 
constrains the ability of many if not most of Chinese farmers to achieve a scale of operation that   5
can absorb drought events. Thus in Buck’s study the average cultivated land in 1929-1933 was 
4.17 acres. Fei and Chang (1945) report (1933) land size per household as 5.7 Mu or 0.87 acres 
in Luts’un. In 1917 Liberty Hyde Bailey recorded a household standard of one mu per person 
(Dorf 1956) leading to a life of toil and poverty that he found incomprehensible. To place this 
historical context in perspective to the current study, our surveys record average farm size per 
household of 5.52 Mu or 1.36 mu per household member (Table 2). The average household 
income of 11,477 Yuan represents approximately 31 Yuan/day per household or approximately 
$4.62/day per household or $1.13/day per capita. 
For households that are barely above poverty levels weather calamities can rapidly cause 
deteriorating conditions for Chinese farmers. Crop losses arise from delays in planting or harvest 
or poor growing conditions. Inexpensive weather insurance may provide sufficient reward under 
extreme drought or heat conditions, but there is no baseline information on which to determine 
what types of weather risk are more important for Chinese farmers or whether Chinese farmers 
would have an interest in purchasing weather insurance.  The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate weather risks facing Chinese farmers, and to determine whether farmers would have a 
preference for weather insurance over other types of agricultural insurance. In addition we gather 
information on how farmers obtain weather information including, if known, the distance to the 
closest weather station. Our data is based on 1,564 farm households surveyed in Shaanxi, Henan 
and Gansu provinces in Central China between October 2007 and October 2008. Table 2 
provides a general overview of the sample. 
   6
Background and Literature Review on Using Weather Insurance in Developing Economies 
The design and application of weather risk management products for development agriculture is 
becoming very popular (Barret et al 2007) and follows from a significant trade in weather 
insurance in global markets. Roth et al (2008) citing a study by Price-Waterhouse-Coopers 
(2007) indicate that the notional value of weather insurance world-wide had a notional value of  
$U.S. 19.2 billion in 2006/2007 but had reached as high as $U.S.45 billion in 2005/6.  The most 
visible applications have been sponsored by  the Commodity Risk Management Group (CRMG) 
at the World Bank which has been piloting index-based weather insurance for developing 
country producers, agricultural businesses, and banks in  India, Peru, Ukraine, Ethiopia and 
Malawi IRI (2009) ( see also Skees at al 2008;Skees (2008a,b). Using weather insurance to fund 
famine relief in Africa has been proposed by Chantarat et al (2007,2008) and risk-contingent 
credit applied to weather events has been proposed by Turvey (2008).  
The methodology behind weather insurance has been described in detail by numerous 
authors including Turvey (2001, 2006), Richards et al (2004) and Odening et al (2006). These 
methods are evolving under two distinct approaches. First the burn rate approach, by far the most 
popular, establishes criteria for a specific event risk and uses historical data on an annual basis to 
determine the frequency at which the specific event occurs and when it does occur, by how 
much. The burn rate approach can be applied to both precipitation and heat related events. The 
second approach is to follow along the lines of equilibrium option pricing. This approach is not 
practical for precipitation but various models based on cooling or growing degree-days have 
been suggested including Turvey (2006), Richards  et al (2005) and Xu et al (2008).  It should be 
noted however that weather insurance can be applied to any type of specific event risk including 
daily precipitation, accumulated precipitation, daily temperature maxima or minima, average   7
temperatures, or heating, cooling or growing degree days. Payoffs can be binary, in which the 
farmer receives a lump sum payout if the specific event occurs, or can be graduated paying an 
indemnity that increases linearly with the intensity of the weather event. Turvey and Norton 
(2008) describe a computer program that calculates weather insurance premiums under these 
alternatives. However, there is also emerging some ideas tying weather insurance to the 
emergence of insect infestations (Richards et al 2006, 2008) or plant disease (Norton and Turvey 
2008; Workneh et al 2008). Regardless of what problem is taken the basic element of weather 
insurance is to establish a time dependent boundary condition at which the specific event is 
measured. This boundary condition is given by  
(1)  [ ] ,0 call T vM a x x Z =−  
(2)  [ ] ,0
rT
call T Ve E M a x x Z φ ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦  
for a weather insurance with ‘call option’ features, and  
(3)  [ ] ,0 put T vM a x Z x =−  
(4)  [ ] ,0
rT
put T Ve E M a x Z x φ ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦  
for weather insurance with ‘put option’ features. Weather insurance can also include multiple 
events where an indemnity can be paid over multiple outcomes. For multiple events we can 
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Where  t h  is the temperature measure of day t and H is a target.  65 H =  degrees Fahrenheit is 
the common measure used in the energy industry for cooling degree days, and  50 H =  degrees 
Fahrenheit is a common target for measuring crop or corn heat units.  
 
Examples of Heat and Precipitation Insurance 
Obtaining climate data from China is difficult; however we can at least provide an example of 
how weather insurance operates by using U.S. data from a region with climatological similarities 
to China. We choose the weather station at Ashland Kansas because not only is it centrally 
located in the United States but also in Kansas’ wheat belt, just north of Cimarron county on the 
Oklahoma panhandle. This area of wheat is subject to extreme heat conditions as well as periodic 
droughts, including a 1979 drought that saw less than 1” of rain in 79 days. Although extended 
droughts of this length are rare, 1 in 100 years, the area is subject to drought conditions up to 40 
days in 4 of every 10 years, and 30 days in almost 3 of every 4 years. It is also subject to extreme 
heat conditions. Between May 1 and August 31 the historical degree-days above 80F is 1,320.18 
with a high of 2,069 degree days recorded in 1934. According to Buck’s study discussed in the 
introduction, drought with crop loss occurs about 1 in every 5 years in the major crop growing 
areas of China, which by our standards would suggest a range between 45 and 50 days with less   9
than 1” of rain. The 2006, 2008 and 2009 droughts in China were reported as the worst in 50 
years and were approximately 70 days or more in length. In Ashland three 75-day droughts were 
observed between 1901 and 2006 for a percentage rate of 2 to 3 times a century, within the range 
of the dramatic droughts found in China in recent years. 
Table 1 provides results from Turvey and Norton’s (2008) computer program 
(www.weatherwizard.us) for specific event precipitation insurance. Days of drought are defined 
and up to 5 non-overlapping drought events can be insured where arithmetically possible. The 
table provides the event frequencies, the insurance premium based on a tic value of 100 Yuan, 
and the maximum payout. As is familiar multiple events of short drought durations (e.g 20 day 
droughts) are far more likely to occur than extended droughts of 40 or 70 days and consequently 
come at higher premiums. For example a 30-day drought does not occur 23.6% of the time, 
occurs once 47.2% of the time, twice 25.5% of the time and three times only 3.8% of the time. 
The cost of this insurance would be 248 Yuan and the maximum payout would have been 1,380 
Yuan. The relationship between Indemnity and coverage is provided in Figure 1, which shows a 
logarithmic reduction in premium as the rarity in event risk increases. 
Heat risk is presented in Figure 2 with the premiums recorded on the Y axis and the 
degree-day strike on the x-axis. This insurance profile is for extreme heat in which the actual 
degree-days in any year exceed the coverage level (features of a call option). Undiscounted 
premiums range from 10,713 Yuan for a strike equal to mean degree days, but this premium falls 
rapidly as the strike increases. For a strike of 1,700 degree days the premium is 946 Yuan, and 
for a strike of 2,000 it is only 67 Yuan.  
Finally we also consider a joint risk contract which combines specific events on 
precipitation (less than 1” of rain in 40 days) as well as heat (degree-days in excess of 1,600.   10
Historically, degree days in excess of 1,600 occurred in 13 of 102 years or 12.7% of the time, 
while a 40 day drought occurs at least once in 34% of the years. The joint occurrence of both the 
heat and precipitation event occurs in only 9 of 102 years or 8.8% of the time. If a farmer wanted 
to receive 1,000 Yuan should the joint event occur, the undiscounted fair premium would be 88 
Yuan.   
 
China Survey Data and Results 
This section of the paper reports survey results from 1564 farm households surveyed 
between October 2007 and October 2008 in Gansu, Henan and Shaanxi China. Questions on risk 
attitudes, risk management practices, weather risk, interest or use of insurance products, and 
interest in weather insurance were asked as a subsection to a much broader range of questions 
dealing with risk, livelihood and credit. Little is known about the specific event weather risks 
faced by Chinese farmers, and even less is known about their attitudes towards or willingness to 
consider purchasing agricultural insurance. 
The sample profile is presented in Table 2. Average household income was 11,477 Yuan 
with the poorest farmers being in Henan Province. Farm size is on average 5.52 mu where 1 mu 
is approximately 1/6
th of an acre. In other words the agricultural livelihood was derived from 
growing mostly corn and wheat on about 1 acre of land. The smallest farms were in Henan, and 
although 58.7% of household income was derived from farming activities on average, in Henan 
limited off-farm opportunities restricted income from farming to 71% of household income. 
The first step was to identify the relative risk of specific weather events. Based on a 5-
Point scale farmers were asked in which months the risk of low rainfall, high rainfall, low 
temperature, and high temperature was important with a 1 being not important and 5 being   11
extremely important. The results are summarized in Figures 3-6. Precipitation is the most 
significant risk, with low precipitation or drought being slightly more important than excessive 
rain. Drought risk is bimodal with two peaks, in the spring (March) and in the summer (July). 
Excessive rain also has twin peaks, with the most severe risk in June and then in the harvest 
months of September and October. Temperature does not appear to be as important but 
respondents indicated that excessive heat in July was an important risk factor. Cool temperatures 
had a fairly neutral response. 
To gain some perspective on attitudes towards risk and risk management we asked 
farmers about their willingness to adopt new technologies and management practices. The 
reasoning for asking these questions was to gain insights into whether or not they would be 
averse to a new insurance product.  The results in Table 3 indicate that the farmers are willing to 
accept the risks of new production risks, new technologies and new management practices. 
About 64% were moderately willing or willing to take new production risks. This is slightly less 
than about 74% willing to accept risks on new technologies and 71% for new management 
practices. The main point to take from this is that these farmers are not closed out to ideas, and 
are not overly fearful of new management technologies that they do not fully understand. It also 
reveals a willingness to adapt and improve the farming business, a characteristic which we 
believe is critical to the successful adoption of weather insurance. 
Table 4 shows results from inquiries into current risk management practices. About 65% 
of farmers believe that diversification is an important risk management tool although about 17% 
indicated that they do not diversify. About 43% of farmers indicate that spatial diversification is 
important; that is having farm plots in different locations is important. In China, many farms are 
non-contiguous because of the allocation of land among family members, but in most cases the   12
land will be within an operational walking distance. Irrigation is of importance to 64% of farmers 
although 24% do not have access to irrigation. It is easy to presume that those that do not use 
irrigation is because they do not have access rather than because they do not deem it important. 
Irrigation is widely available in Yangling in Shaanxi with nearly 90% having access to irrigation, 
whereas 42% of Gansu farmers do not have access to irrigation. While important, the atomistic 
nature of Chinese agriculture limits the ability of farmers to forward sell or spread sales 
throughout the year. The majority of farmers in our sample grow wheat followed by corn. 
Storage facilities are virtually non existent. In addition both corn and wheat are harvested at the 
same time in the study area. Other products such as nuts and peppers for example can be 
harvested over a longer period of time, but in general the pepper harvest occurs at the same time 
as the corn harvest, with stone milling done by some farm households in the village itself. 
Although government support is deemed important by most farmers, access to support is not 
universal with 35% of farmers indicating that they do not use government programs. Farmers 
also recognize the importance of precautionary savings and investments with 53% and 55% of 
farmers indicating so. About 20% of farmers do not use precautionary savings but just over 71% 
do use some form of off-farm investment to generate cash, although the nature of these 
investments was not asked.  
In Table 5 we queried farmers on their insurance decisions. First we described what a 
crop insurance product was, and then asked them about their interest in purchasing crop 
insurance.  
“Crop insurance is a common tool used by western farmers. Crop insurance will 
pay you if your crop yield falls below some percentage of your average yields. 
For example if your yield is 1,000 kg/ Mu for a particular crop, insurance may 
provide a payment if actual crop yield falls below 70% of this average. For 
example if actual yield is 500Kg then you would receive a payment based on the 
difference between 700kg and 500 kg (200kg) times the average harvest price. If   13
the price is 5Yuan then you would receive 5*(700-500)=RMB1,000 but if yields 
are above 700kg you receive nothing.” 
 
About 40% for farmers indicated that they would regularly purchase a crop insurance product 
regularly with 63% indicating at least occasionally. Only 25% of farmers indicated that they 
would not purchase crop insurance. We then asked if there was any other type of insurance that 
they purchased; 39.2% purchased life insurance, 8.2% had fire insurance, 6% had automobile 
insurance (there are in fact very few automobiles in the survey districts), and 88.2% purchase 
health insurance. We also asked about current purchases of crop and livestock insurance an 17% 
and 10% of farmers indicated that they had purchased some form of agricultural insurance, but 
with rather incomplete agricultural insurance markets in China we are unsure as to how they 
interpreted ‘crop’ or ‘livestock’ insurance. Nonetheless, these results indicate that Chinese 
farmers are not entirely adverse to purchasing insurance products. More important is the 
recognition of the importance of crop insurance and a willingness to purchase crop insurance 
occasionally or regularly. 
Table 6 responds to a general question of weather insurance. The preamble included the 
following statement which was read to all respondents; 
 “New types of insurance products based on excessive rainfall, deficit rainfall, excessive 
heat or cold weather are being evaluated for potential use in agriculture. For example, if 
you buy deficit rainfall insurance, you will receive a payment if the number of inches of 
rain that fall in your farm during a month or a season is less than what you expected. The 
money you will get is based only on how much shortfall in rainfall you will experience. It 
is not based on how much yield shortfall you experience. Your insurance contract will be 
written based on the historical rainfall data at your local weather station or if possible 
on a weather station on your farm”.  
 
Farmers were then asked to indicate interest in five possible weather products. These farmers 
show a much stronger affinity towards precipitation insurance than heat-based insurance; 50.8% 
of farmers are at least somewhat interested in low rainfall insurance, while 44.2% would have   14
interest in excessive rainfall (only 26% would not at all be interested); 35.3% are at least 
somewhat interested in excessive heat insurance, but the interest is much lower for cool-weather 
insurance with about 30% showing interest.  For these farmers there was not a great interest in 
wind insurance either.   
We were interested in the timing of weather insurance and asked the respondents at 
which time in the production process would weather insurance be of most interest. There is little 
difference in interest between planting, cultivating and harvesting the crops, which is consistent 
with the bi-modality of the importance of weather risk in Figures 3 and 4. These results suggest 
that should weather insurance be offered in China, the insurer could offer a variety of products, 
most likely tied to precipitation, throughout the year. Because the significance of the weather 
risk, and the underlying crop potential changes throughout the growing period such products 
would need to be targeted. For example the indemnity of drought insurance during planting can 
be tied to reseeding and planting; during the growing season where significant reduction in yield 
is a potential hazard but reseeding not a viable option, the indemnity would be higher. In the 
harvest months, losses from weather risk could be tied to lateness of harvest or degradation in 
quality and quantity of harvested crops. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The development and distribution of weather insurance products to farmers in China has several 
points of merit. First with small farms of between 1 and 2 acres the application of traditional crop 
insurance with its associated underwriting costs would be virtually impossible without a 
significant bureaucracy and public cost. One alternative that has had significant interest and 
impact over the past decade has been weather insurance. Weather insurance requires recording   15
climatological data at a specific weather station over a period of time and thus resolves the 
problem of underwriting what could be tens of millions of micro insurance contracts. The added 
benefit is that the weather insurance does not discourage best management practices because 
there are no adverse incentives or asymmetric information issues. This study surveyed over 
1,500 farmers in Western China (Gansu and Shaanxi) and Central China (Henan),to identify 
several related factors to risk management and to establish whether or not there would be a 
general interest in weather insurance. The results suggest that farmers are not overly averse to 
adopting new technologies or practices to improve farm conditions even if these come with 
added risk or unknown outcomes. There is a general consensus that rainfall insurance during 
planting and cultivation and heat insurance during cultivation and harvesting could be of interest, 
but so too would be an excessive rainfall insurance contract. Respondent farmers were equally as 
interested in weather insurance at planting, growing and harvest suggesting that any pilot 
program should target multiple contracts throughout the year. Overall, perhaps as many as 40% 
of farmers would be interested in a weather-risk insurance contract which indicates a significant 
potential demand. 
We are, of course under no illusion as to how complex the introduction of weather 
insurance would be in China. Agricultural insurance itself is underdeveloped so the conceptual 
basis of weather insurance may not so easily be understood by farmers. In addition there is no 
general infrastructure for selling agricultural insurance, although it would be reasonable to 
suggest that any such product could be sold through the existing network of Rural Credit 
Cooperatives or the emerging network of Postal Savings Banks. Even if weather insurance could 
be sold through Rural Credit Cooperatives, there still needs to be put in place a reinsurance 
mechanism to cover excess exposure to systemic risks (Roth et al 2008). As discussed in the   16
introduction there have been significant droughts across the agricultural regions of China in 
2006, 2008 and 2009 that have been described in term s of 50-year events. Losses for such 
expansive loss would need to be layered between the local insurer and a global reinsurer which 
could transfer such risks into the capital markets. The legal and regulatory environment in China 
would have to be adapted to account for this. 
The survey results are encouraging in that it signals a desire for agricultural insurance, a 
willingness amongst Chinese farmers to adopt new ideas when presented to them, and an 
openness to purchase insurance in general. But how would weather insurance work? Skees, 
Barnett and Murphy (2008) describe a three-tiered model used for livestock index insurance. 
Assuming that RCCs can obtain regulatory approval to underwrite insurance or operate as an 
agent of an insurance company a special purpose vehicle (SVP) would be established into which 
all participating insurers would deposit initial capital equal to 40% of expected insurance 
premiums, net of loading (administrative) costs. Shares would be issued and profits, if any, 
distributed to the insurers on a pro rata basis. The actual premiums collected from farmers would 
then be added to the original capital. This makes up the first tranche of indemnity financing. The 
second tranche is obtained from reinsurers who can access capital markets. For example in Skees 
et al (2008) the reinsurers cover a layer of loss above 105% of premiums and SVP capital. The 
insurers will use a portion of the funds available to purchase reinsurance. The reinsurers in turn 
would establish a fund from which indemnity payments in excess of 105% loss would be paid up 
to a maximum amount which could be the capital in the reinsurance fund or some negotiated 
amount. Should losses deplete both the insurers funds and the reinsurer funds, a third tranche is 
established using commitments from the Chinese government, the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank or some other institution that could cover the losses. For example consider   17
the example in Table 1. 55 days-in-drought is approximately a 1 in 10 year event (9.4% chance 
of a 55-day drought). The cost of this is 14 Yuan with a maximum (catastrophic) payout 
historically being 570 Yuan. The first tranche funds on a single contract would be 40% 
contributed under the SPV (5.6 Yuan) plus the premium for a total indemnity fund of 19.6 Yuan.  
The insurer may request the reinsurer to cover all or a portion of the indemnities above 105% of 
premiums ( 14.7 Yuan) as in the Mongolian model, or they can sell a portion of extreme risks. 
Suppose that the insurers requested that the reinsurer cover losses above a 70-day drought. The 
insurers will pay the reinsurers 8 Yuan in order to place the second tranche. To avoid complete 
depletion of reinsurance funds, the third tranche may be requested to cover losses equal to or 
above 79 days. The expectation that the third tranche will be used is about 0.9% with an 
expected payout of 1 Yuan per insurance contract.   
Even if the distribution of insurance and the layering of risk between farmer, insurer and 
reinsurer can be resolved,  we do not claim that weather insurance will solve all the problems of 
production risk in China. For small risks with less than 20% it would be more prudent for 
farmers to hold precautionary savings because, as illustrated in the example provided in this 
paper, the cost of high frequency events is prohibitive. We agree with Skees (2008a,b) that 
weather insurance should be designed to cover low frequency high loss catastrophic events. Not 
only are these products more cost affective but we cannot ignore the household characteristics of 
the Chinese farmer either. With an average per capita income of just over $1.00/day the sample 
of farmers in our survey could not so easily purchase weather insurance ex ante without having 
to give some other consumer/production item up in return. On the other hand should the 
insurance be purchased and a catastrophic event occurs, the insurance itself can transfer 
significant risk and provide the household with a liquid source of cash when it is needed the   18
most. There needs to be some effort to determine a willingness to pay for weather insurance 
(Musshoff et al 2008) and tools would have to be constructed to price weather risk to a local 
weather station and would also have to recognize the basis risk between the weather events at the 
farm and the weather events recorded at the local weather station (Woodward and Garcia 2008; 
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Table 1: Specific-Event Precipitation Premiums for  China Proxy Weather at Ashland Kansas, 1901-2006.  
The insurance allows for up to 5 non-overlapping drought events with a tick value of 1,000 Yuan. (Source 
Turvey and Norton 2007; www.weatherwizard.us) 
  Number of Events in Year   
Days in 
Drought 
0 1 2 3 4 5 Premium  Maximum 
Payout 
20 0.038 0.057 0.255 0.359 0.217 0.076 1,228 3,040
25 0.151 0.264 0.412 0.132 0.037 -  656  2,040
30 0.236 0.472 0.255 0.038 -  -  388  1,380
35 0.415 0.491 0.094 -  -  -  248  1,230
40 0.594 0.349 0.057 -  -  -  119  930
45 0.764 0.226 0.094 -  -  -  57  760
50  0.868  0.132  - - - -  28  500
55  0.906  0.094  - - - -  14  570
60  0.934  0.066  - - - -  10  490
65  0.943  0.057  - - - -  9  300
70  0.962  0.038  - - - -  8  510
75  0.972  0.028  - - - -  7  510
79  0.991  0.009  - - - -  1  100
 






















Gansu Mean  11186.68  45.33 7.82 26.88 2609.46  1.81
Henan Mean  6176.88  71.17 3.43 27.42 1732.68  0.96
Qianyang Mean  15308.25  48.30 6.11 26.98 3730.16 1.56
Yangling Mean  13214.01  68.58 4.90 28.23 3112.93  1.16
Total Mean  11477.46 58.71 5.52 27.39 2799.80  1.36  22
 
Table 3: Aversion To Technology Adoption. We asked this question to obtain some idea of the risk attitudes 
of respondents. The results indicate that there are differences by region, but in terms of adopting new 





Gansu Henan  Qianyang  Yangling Total 
  
Column N %  Column N %  Column N %  Column N %  Column N % 
Adverse  To  Risk  17.7% 17.5% 23.8% 12.6% 17.9% 
Moderately Adverse to 
Risk 
10.7%  6.5% 14.8%  9.0% 10.2% 
Neutral Towards Risk  9.0%  6.0% 5.8% 6.5% 6.8% 
Moderately Willing To Take 
Risk 
30.1% 24.1% 24.5% 25.1% 25.8% 
I am willing to accept 
greater production risks to 
increase the chance of 
higher profits  
Willing To Take Risk  32.6%  45.9% 31.3% 46.7% 39.3% 
Adverse To Risk  18.3%  9.8%  15.0%  5.5%  12.0% 
Moderately Adverse to 
Risk 
8.1% 5.0%  12.8% 5.8% 7.9% 
Neutral Towards Risk  10.7%  5.5% 7.0% 2.3% 6.2% 
Moderately Willing To Take 
Risk 
25.8% 25.1% 25.0% 25.6% 25.4% 
I am willing to take risks 
with new technologies 
before I see good results in 
other farms 
Willing To Take Risk  37.1%  54.6% 40.3% 60.8% 48.5% 
Adverse To Risk  18.3%  9.3%  11.5%  6.6%  11.2% 
Moderately Adverse to 
Risk 
8.1% 5.0%  12.5% 9.8% 8.9% 
Neutral Towards Risk  11.8%  10.1% 7.5% 6.8% 9.0% 
Moderately Willing To Take 
Risk 
26.4% 25.9% 27.3% 27.8% 26.8% 
I am willing to take risks 
with new management 
practices before I see good 
results in other farms 
Willing To Take Risk  35.4%  49.7% 41.3% 49.0% 44.1% 
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Gansu Henan  Qianyang  Yangling Total 
  
Column N %  Column N %  Column N %  Column N %  Column N % 
Don't  Use  19.44% 19.30% 15.00% 13.82% 16.82% 
Not  Important  4.23% 4.01% 4.50% 6.53% 4.83% 
Somewhat  Important  6.20% 1.75% 5.25% 7.79% 5.22% 
Important  9.30% 8.52% 6.75% 6.78% 7.80% 
Quite  Important  36.62% 38.85% 35.75% 35.18% 36.60% 
More than one crop, animal, or 
enterprise diversification 
Very  Important  24.23% 27.57% 32.75% 29.90% 28.74% 
Don't  Use  26.40% 34.34% 21.00% 19.14% 25.19% 
Not  Important  13.20%  4.26% 12.50% 10.33%  9.99% 
Somewhat  Important  8.99% 2.01% 8.00% 8.82% 6.89% 
Important  14.04% 14.54%  8.75% 18.14% 13.85% 
Quite  Important  27.25% 31.33% 30.00% 29.47% 29.57% 
Fields or farms in different 
locations (geographic 
diversification) 
Very  Important  10.11% 13.53% 19.75% 14.11% 14.50% 
Don't  Use  42.82% 20.55% 24.75%  9.82% 23.98% 
Not  Important  8.73%  .75% 4.75% 1.76% 3.87% 
Somewhat  Important  5.92%  .00% 1.75% 4.53% 2.97% 
Important  12.11% 1.75% 2.75% 8.06% 6.00% 
Quite  Important  16.34% 18.05% 20.50% 25.94% 20.31% 
Irrigation 
Very  Important  14.08% 58.90% 45.50% 49.87% 42.88% 
Don't  Use  35.96% 40.45% 35.25% 21.86% 33.31% 
Not  Important  8.71%  11.31% 7.25% 9.55% 9.21% 
Somewhat  Important  6.18% 4.02% 4.25% 5.28% 4.90% 
Important  18.82% 18.34% 10.50% 13.07% 15.08% 
Quite  Important  16.85% 18.34% 19.75% 30.65% 21.52% 
Spreading sales: selling each 
product over a period of time 
rather than all at once 
(diversified marketing) 
Very  Important  13.48%  7.54% 23.00% 19.60% 15.98% 
Don't  Use  44.94% 66.92% 55.75% 44.47% 53.25% 
Not  Important  7.30% 3.76% 8.50% 5.78% 6.31% 
Somewhat  Important  5.06% 1.00% 2.25% 6.03% 3.54% 
Important 14.33%  5.26%  6.25%  14.07%  9.85% 
Quite  Important  18.54% 14.54% 14.75% 18.34% 16.48% 
Using contracts to market your 
crop in advance at a fixed 
price 
Very  Important  9.83%  8.52% 12.50% 11.31% 10.56% 
Don't  Use  28.93% 46.37% 46.37% 18.64% 35.27% 
Not  Important  4.21% 1.75% 5.26% 4.03% 3.80% 
Somewhat  Important  5.06% 3.01% 4.26% 5.29% 4.38% 
Important 13.48%  3.76%  6.27%  10.33%  8.32% 
Government programs  




Gansu Henan  Qianyang  Yangling Total 
  
Column N %  Column N %  Column N %  Column N %  Column N % 
Very  Important  20.51% 21.30% 15.54% 28.46% 21.47% 
Don't  Use  25.00% 23.81% 18.75% 12.06% 19.77% 
Not  Important  5.34% 8.02% 5.75% 6.53% 6.44% 
Somewhat  Important  4.49% 5.01% 5.50% 4.77% 4.96% 
Important  19.10% 11.28% 10.25% 13.82% 13.46% 
Quite  Important  30.06% 42.11% 34.75% 38.69% 36.57% 
Maintaining financial reserves: 
having cash and readily 
convertible assets(e.g. 
machineries, livestock) 
Very  Important  16.01%  9.77% 25.00% 24.12% 18.80% 
Don't  Use  26.27% 41.85% 24.25% 21.61% 28.56% 
Not  Important  4.24% 5.26% 5.00% 5.53% 5.03% 
Somewhat  Important  5.08% 2.76% 3.75% 5.78% 4.32% 
Important  12.99% 6.52% 8.00% 5.78% 8.19% 
Quite  Important  28.81% 16.04% 24.75% 20.35% 22.31% 
Investing off-farm for other 
sources of income 
Very  Important  22.60% 27.57% 34.25% 40.95% 31.59% 
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Table 5: Crop and Other Forms of Insurance 
   Region Province 
   Gansu Henan  Qianyang  Yangling Total 
   Column N %  Column N %  Column N %  Column N %  Column N % 
Regularly 34.83%  42.86% 33.42% 48.74% 40.10%
Occasionally 18.26%  20.80% 29.90% 23.37% 23.21%
In some years  16.29%  11.78% 13.32% 6.28%  11.80%
Interest in buying crop 
insurance 
Never  30.34% 24.56% 23.37% 21.36% 24.76%
No 54.24%  75.94% 57.14% 55.03% 60.77% Currently buy life insurance 
Yes  45.76% 24.06% 42.86% 44.97% 39.23%
No 87.64%  97.24% 87.00% 94.72% 91.76% Currently buy fire 
insurance Yes  12.36%  2.76% 13.00% 5.28% 8.24%
No 93.26%  96.49% 89.72% 96.21% 93.94% Currently buy auto 
insurance Yes  6.74%  3.51% 10.28% 3.79% 6.06%
No 17.98%  9.52% 7.25% 12.78% 11.71% Currently buy health 
insurance Yes  82.02%  90.48% 92.75% 87.22% 88.29%
No 78.93%  81.95% 80.50% 89.47% 82.82% Currently buy crop 
insurance Yes  21.07%  18.05% 19.50% 10.53% 17.18%
No 87.08%  91.23% 87.75% 91.96% 89.57% Currently buy livestock  
insurance Yes  12.92%  8.77% 12.25% 8.04%  10.43%





Table 6: General Interest in Weather Insurance. The table shows that farmers would have a modest overall 
interest in weather insurance.  Excessive and deficit rainfall would be more attractive than policies against  
heat extremes or winds. 








Interest in a risk management 
tool-excessive rainfall 
34.40% 9.40% 12.00% 20.30% 23.90% 
Interest in a risk management 
tool-excessive heat 
40.30% 10.40% 14.20% 19.40% 15.80% 
Interest in  a  risk management 
tool-deficit in rainfall 
26.00% 9.10% 14.00% 21.40% 29.40% 
Interest in  a  risk management 
tool-cold weather 
41.60% 11.20% 16.90% 16.60% 13.60% 
Interest in  a  risk management 
tool-high winds 
45.60% 11.00% 14.30% 15.90% 13.20% 
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Table 7: Relationship Between Farming Activity And Weather Insurance. The table indicates that should 
weather insurance be made available, farmers would have interest throughout the growing year 
 Table  1     


















Importance of weather insurance 
in planting 
8.90% 3.90% 11.90% 32.40% 43.00% 
Importance of weather insurance 
in growing 
5.40% 3.40% 12.70% 34.60% 43.90% 
Importance of weather insurance 
in harvesting 
7.80% 3.30% 10.60% 30.00% 48.30% 
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Figure 1: Insurance Indemnity Profile for Multiple-Event Precipitation Insurance. China Proxy at Ashland 
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Figure 2: Insurance Indemnity Profile for Degree-Day Heat Insurance based on 80F. China Proxy at Ashland 
KS 1901-2006   30
 










































































































































Figure 3: Relative Importance of Precipitation Risk. Graph shows farmers’ response to questions about the 
importance of precipitation risk (drought) throughout the production year. Henan shows a greater 
propensity to drought risk than other study areas,   31













































































Figure 4: Relative Importance of Excessive Precipitation Risk.    32
 









































































Figure 5: Relative Importance of Excessive Heat.  
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Figure 6: Relative Importance of Low Temperature Risk. 
 